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Salafi jihadism, also known as Salafi-jihadism, jihadist Salafism and revolutionary Salafism, is a religiopolitical Sunni Islam Islamist ideology that seeks to establish a global caliphate through armed struggle. In a narrower sense, jihadism refers to the belief that armed struggle with political rivals is an efficient and theologically legitimate method of socio-political change. The Salafist interpretation of sacred Islamic texts is "in their most literal, traditional sense",Kepel, Jihad, 2002, pp. 220-222 which adherents claim will bring about the return to "true Islam".
Jihadist and Salafist elements of the new "hybrid" ideology developed by international volunteers (Arab-Afghan mujahideen) had not been joined previously because mainstream Salafis, dubbed by some Western commentators as "good Salafis", had mostly adhered to political quietism and eschewed political activities and partisan allegiances. Jihad had been viewed as potentially divisive for the broader Ummah and as a distraction from the studying and practicing of Islam. Prominent Quietist Salafi scholars have denounced doctrines of Salafi jihadism as Bid'ah ("innovation") and "heretical", strongly forbidding Muslims from participating or assisting in any armed underground activity against ruling governments. Jihadist salafists often dismiss the quietist scholars as "'sheikist" traitors, portraying them as palace scholars worried about the patronage of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula" rather than pure Islam, and contend that they are not dividing the Muslim community because, in their view, the rulers of Muslim-majority countries and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack are not actually part of the community, having deviated from Islam and become apostates or Munafiq.
Early ideologues of the movement were Arab Afghan veterans of the Afghan jihad, such as Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the naturalized Spanish Syrian Abu Musab, and Mustapha Kamel known as Abu Hamza al-Masri, among others. The jihadist ideology of Qutbism has been identified variously as the ideological foundation of the movement, a closely related Islamist ideology,
or a variety of revolutionary Salafism. While Salafism had little presence in Europe during the 1980s, Salafi jihadists had by the mid-2000s acquired "a burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among E.U. countries since 2001". While many see the influence and activities of Salafi jihadists as in decline after 2000 (at least in the United States), others see the movement as growing in the wake of the Arab Spring, the breakdown of state control in Libya and Syria in 2014, and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
According to Madawi Al Rasheed, ideology of Jihadi-Salafism is a post-modern hybridity whose sources can be found in the past and present, in both the Muslim world and Western world. Thus, it is the outcome of cross-fertilisation of sources that are both transnational and local, resulting in a devastating ideology that re-invents the past to induce a "cataclysmic war between two binary oppositions". Contemporary Salafi-Jihadis are primarily products of modernity rather than an extension of traditional Muslim societies. Thus, Jihadis seek to create a mimicry of the West of which they want to be part of, but reject the other leading to violence. However, more than the ideology itself, it is the circumstances that explain the appeal of Jihadis which is the real cause of violence. The traditional Mujahideen of the previous eras, such as ‘Omar al-Mukhtar, ‘Emir Abdelkader and ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam were a different category of people, products of different social circumstances who sought to liberate occupied lands from foreign Imperialism and Colonialism penetrations. Although they gained solidarity across the Islamic World, they were not transnational actors. Salafi-Jihadis on the other hand, die for an imagined globalised faith, shares Western modernity (despite its critique), and advocate a Neoliberalism Free market rationale, in their quest for a global World Order. Thus Jihadi-Salafism has as much to do with the West as with Salafism or religion in general.
Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shia rule". Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such as Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, Wasiullah Abbas, Zubair Ali Zai, and Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh) but also from the sahwa movement movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali.
According to Michael Horowitz, Salafi jihad is an ideology that identifies the "alleged source of the Muslims' conundrum" in the "persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms 'Crusaders', 'Zionists', and 'apostates'." The concept was described by the American-Israeli scholar Martin Kramer as an academic term that "will inevitably be simplified jihadism or the jihadist movement in popular usage."
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":
Another researcher, Thomas Hegghammer, has outlined five objectives shared by jihadis:
Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of
Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Al Sharif describes Salafi jihadism as combining "the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism and organisational models from Muslim Brotherhood organisations. Their motto emerged as 'Salafism in doctrine, modernity in confrontation.
Salafi jihadists distinguish themselves from Quietist salafis whom they label "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believe – that the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head". Principal among the sheikist scholars was Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz – "the archetypal court ulema ''ulama". These allegedly "false" salafi "had to be striven against and eliminated", but even more infuriating was the Salafi Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, whom the Salafi jihadists considered excessively moderate and lacking in a stricter literalist interpretation of holy texts.
Quietist Salafi scholarship in turn, denounce Salafi jihadism as a heterodox ideology far-removed from Salafi orthodoxy. Quietist Salafi scholars such as Albani, Ibn Uthaymeen, Ibn Baz, Saleh Al-Fawzan, and Muqbil ibn Hadi condemned rebellion against the rulers as "the most corrupt of innovations", and forbade Muslims "to take it upon himself to execute a ruling" which is under the jurisdiction of the rulers. Salafi jihadists contend that they are not dividing the Ummah because, in their view, the rulers of Muslim-majority countries and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack have deviated from Islam and are actually apostates or Munafiq.
Quietist Salafis criticize Al-Qaeda and Islamic State as Qutbism and often label Salafi Islamist as "Muhammad Surur". According to them, these organizations are directly opposed to Salafiyya and its manhaj (methodology). Major doctrines of the Salafi Jihadist movement have its roots in early heterodox sects such as the Kharijites. As a result, heavy creedal disparities exist between traditional Salafis and Salafi Jihadists. Mainstream Salafism, which consists of both quietist and political Salafis, reject the violence of Jihadists. Major Purist Salafi Ulama condemn certain Salafi-jihadist organisations as Kharijites.
In his writings, both before and after joining the Muslim Brotherhood Qutb argued that the Muslim world had reached a crisis point and that the Islamic world has been replaced by pagan ignorance of Jahiliyyah, (which directly translates to "ignorance", a term used by Muslims to describe the "dark" ages of pre-Islamic Arabia). When Qutb went abroad for a two-year scholarship to the United States, it is said he came back with extremist radical beliefs. He used what's been often described by scholars as his "genuine literary excellence" to spread these views of western criticism to form the main intellectual doctrine for the Muslim Brotherhood, which later be adopted by most terrorist organizations worldwide.Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, (2004) pp. 174–75Kepel, Jihad, (2002), p. 51
Qutbism doctrine of Islam interpretation emphasizes how the secular, infidel Muslim leaders and populations have fallen to imitating the western way of life, and that before any prosperity would occur, the Muslim world must revert to the Caliphate-age Sharia Law instead of "Man-made laws". He issued ideological & religious debates stating that the violent means are justifiable under Islamic Law for an end as great as returning the Islamic state "days of glory", and these means are often leading a victorious violent holy war (Jihad) against the Western world. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), Authorized Edition, pp. 50, 466 (n. 12).
A part of his writings which have influenced Islamists and terrorist organizations on the nature of The West, can be found in his book " The America that I Have Seen", which he wrote immediately after returning to Egypt from the United States. In it he complained of Western materialism, individual freedoms, economic system, racism, brutal boxing matches, "poor" ,David Von Drehle, A Lesson In Hate Smithsonian Magazine superficiality in conversations and friendships, Excerpt from Qutb's article "Amrika allati Ra'aytu" (The America That I Have Seen) restrictions on divorce, enthusiasm for sports, lack of feeling, "animal-like" mixing of the sexes (which "went on even in churches"),Qutb, Milestones, p. 139 and strong support for the new Israel.Calvert, John (2000), "'The World is an Undutiful Boy!': Sayyid Qutb's American Experience," Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 87–103:98.
He was appalled by what he perceived as loose sexual openness of American men and women. Qutb noted with disapproval the openly displayed sexuality of American women stating in the same influential book The America that I Have Seen:
the American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs – and she shows all this and does not hide it.
On 29 August 1966, Sayyid Qutb was executed by hanging by Egyptian president's Gamal Abdel-Nasser's regime for his alleged role in the president's assassination plot.Berman, Terror and Liberalism, (2003), p. 63Sivan (1985) p. 93.Fouad Ajami, "In the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt," Islam in the Political Process, editor James P. Piscatori, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 25–26. This would later paint him as an Islamic martyr or shahid (he is often called "Shahid Sayyid Qutb" or Sayyid Qutb al-Shahid by admirers) among supporters & Islamist circles, particularly as the trial was alleged to be a show trial.Hasan, S. Badrul, Syed Qutb Shaheed, Islamic Publications International, 2nd ed. 1982 Qutb wrote his major Islamist works (a commentary of the Qur'an, Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an), and a manifesto of political Islam called Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), while incarcerated and allegedly tortured. This, alongside his allegedly extrajudicial execution, elevated the value of these two major writings, giving his radical, violent Islamist doctrine in his writings a stronger influence over future terrorist organizations. Interview with Dr Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh – Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader 8 May 2008
Beginning from 1970s, various Islamist and Jihadist factions attempted to idealize traditional Salafiyya, recasting it as a totalizing political system based on the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb. Majority of Salafis traditionally viewed Salafiyya as a scholarly movement that revived the religious faith of Muslims through teaching and devout adherence to Islamic decrees. Additionally, they advocated Salafism to remain uncontaminated from politics. However, a minority sought the establishment of an Islamic system through violent means, based on Sayyid Qutb's concepts of Hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God). They advocated a global Jihad, with clear political overtones, to fight for Muslim liberation across national boundaries. This movement came to be known as Salafi-Jihadism. Groups like Takfir wal-Hijra, who kidnapped and murdered an Egyptian ex-government minister in 1978, also inspired some of "the tactics and methods" used by Al Qaeda.
In the 1990s, militant Islamists of the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were active in the terrorist attacks on police, government officials, and foreign tourists in Egypt, and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria was a principal extremist group in the Algerian Civil War. In Afghanistan, the Taliban were adherents of the Deobandi, not the Salafi school of Islam, but they closely co-operated with bin Laden and various Salafi-jihadist leaders. CIA officer Marc Sageman described Salafi jihadism as a "Muslim revivalist social movement" with "roots in Egypt". According to Sageman, Salafi Jihadists are influenced by the strategy of prominent Islamist Egyptians such as Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, who advocated the revolutionary overthrow of secular regimes through Jihad and the establishment of Islamic states.
In his research, Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation finds that Salafi-jihadist numbers and activity have increased from 2007 to 2013. According to his research:
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, in Iraq jihadi salafi are pursuing a "system-collapse strategy" whose goal is to install an "Islamic emirate based on Salafi dominance, similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." In addition to occupation/coalition personnel they target mainly Iraqi security forces and Shia civilians, but also "foreign journalists, translators and transport drivers and the economic and physical infrastructure of Iraq."
In the Algerian Civil War 1992–1998, the GIA was one of the two major Islamist armed groups (the other being the Armee Islamique du Salut or AIS) fighting the Algerian army and security forces. The GIA included veterans of the Afghanistan jihad and unlike the more moderate AIS, fought to destabilize the Algerian government with terror attacks designed to "create an atmosphere of general insecurity"."Jihadist-Salafism" is introduced by Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 260–62 It considered jihad in Algeria fard ayn or an obligation for all (sane adult male) Muslims, and sought to "purge" Algeria of "the ungodly" and create an Islamic state. It pursued what Gilles Kepel called "wholesale massacres of civilians", targeting French-speaking intellectuals, foreigners, and Islamists deemed too moderate, and took its campaign of bombing to France, which supported the Algerian government against the Islamists. Although over 150,000 were killed in the civil war, the GIA eventually lost popular support and was crushed by the security forces.Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 260–75 Remnants of the GIA continued on as "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat", which as of 2015 calls itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, (the Islamic Group) another Salafist-jihadi movement fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for a Luxor massacre at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists trapped inside the temple were hunted down and hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999, although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against the Ba'athist Syrian regime.
Perhaps the most famous and effective Salafist jihadist group was Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda evolved from the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1984 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign mujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. As it became apparent that the jihad had compelled the Red Army to abandon its mission in Afghanistan, some mujahideen called for the expansion of their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, and Al Qaeda was formed by bin Laden on August 11, 1988. Members were to making a pledge ( bayat) to follow one's superiors.
Al-Qaeda emphasized jihad against the "far enemy", by which it meant the United States. In 1996, it announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands, and in 1998, it issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies whenever and wherever they could. Among its most notable acts of violence were the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi that killed over 200 people; and the 9/11 attacks of 2001 that killed almost 3,000 people and caused many billions of dollars in damage.According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were the Mujahidin Shura Council and the Ansar al Sunna Group. There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups in Azerbaijan. The Two Faces of Salafism in Azerbaijan . Terrorism Focus Volume: 4 Issue: 40, December 7, 2007, by: Anar Valiyev
The group leading the Islamist insurgency in Southern Thailand in 2006 by carrying out most of the attacks and cross-border operations, BRN-Koordinasi, favours Salafi ideology. It works in a loosely organized strictly clandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction.Rohan Gunaratna & Arabinda Acharya, The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad Or Quest for Justice?Zachary Abuza, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand, INSS, p. 20
Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafist jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, the Islamist group Hamas, for failing to enforce Sharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding his Ibn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people (including Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa himself) were killed and over 130 were wounded. Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), August 19, 2009.
In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests against King Abdullah II of Jordan, and the kidnapping and killing of Italian peace activist Vittorio Arrigoni in Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.
In the North Caucasus region of Russia, the Caucasus Emirate replaced the nationalism of Muslim Chechnya and Dagestan with a hard-line Salafist-takfiri jihadist ideology. They are immensely focused on upholding the concept of tawhid (purist monotheism), and fiercely reject any practice of shirk, taqlid, ijtihad and bid‘ah. They also believe in the complete separation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, by propagating Al Wala' Wal Bara' and declaring takfir against any Muslim who (they believe) is a mushrik (polytheist) and does not return to the observance of tawhid and the strict literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah as followed by Muhammad and his companions (Sahaba).Darion Rhodes, Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate , International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, March 2014
In Syria and Iraq both Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS have been described as Salafist-jihadist. Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime. Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.
Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi jihadism group
that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes,
In December 2017, a salafi-Jihadist mosque in Marseille was closed by authorities for preaching about violent jihad. In August 2018, after the European Court of Human Rights approved the decision, French authorities deported the salafi-Jihadist preacher Elhadi Doudi to his home country Algeria because of his radical messages he spread in Marseille.
Estimates by German interior intelligence service show that it grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 7,500 members in 2015. In Germany, most of the recruitment to the movement is done on the Internet and also on the streets, a propaganda drive which mostly attracts youth. There are two ideological camps, one advocates Salafi-Activism and directs its recruitment efforts towards non-Muslims and non-Salafist Muslims to gain influence in society. The other and minority movement, the jihadist Salafism, advocates gaining influence by the use of violence and nearly all identified terrorist cells in Germany came from Salafist circles.
In 2015, Sigmar Gabriel, Vice-Chancellor of Germany, spoke out, saying "We need Saudi Arabia to solve the regional conflicts, but we must at the same time make clear that the time to look away is past. Wahhabi mosques are financed all over the world by Saudi Arabia. In Germany, many dangerous Islamists come from these communities." Reuters , 6 December 2015, German Vice Chancellor warns Saudi Arabia over Islamist funding.
Deutsche Welle , 6 December 2015, German vice-chancellor warns Saudi Arabia over Islamist funding in Germany In November 2016, nationwide raids were conducted on the Salafi-Islamist True Religion organization.
According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne, the number of Salafists in Germany grew from 9,700 in December 2016 to 10,800 in December 2017. In addition to the rise, the Salafist movement in Germany was increasingly fractured which made them harder to monitor by authorities. According to the office, street distributions of Quran took place less frequently which was described as a success for the authorities. Radicalisation changed character, from taking place in mosques and interregional Salafist organisations to more often happening in small circles, which increasingly formed on the internet. A further development was a rise in participation of women. According to the FFGI at Goethe University Frankfurt, wahhabist ideology is spread in Germany as in other European country mostly by an array of informal, personal and organisational networks, where organisations closely associated with the government of Saudi Arabia such as the Muslim World League (WML) and the World Association of Muslim Youth are actively participating.
In February 2017, the German Salafist mosque organisation Berliner Fussilet-Moscheeverein was banned by authorities. Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the 2016 Berlin truck attack, was said to be among its visitors. In March 2017, the German Muslim community organisation Deutschsprachige Islamkreis Hildesheim was also banned after investigators found that its members were preparing to travel to the conflict zone in Syria to fight for the Islamic State. According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education, these examples show that certain Salafist mosques not only concern themselves with religious matters, but also prepare serious crimes and terrorist activities.
In Hässleholm the Ljusets moské (translated: "mosque of the light") is spreading salafi ideology and portray shia Muslims as apostates and traitors in social media while the atrocities of the Islamic state are never mentioned. In 2009 the imam Abu al-Hareth at the mosque was sentenced to six years in jail for the attempted murder of a local shia Muslim from Iraq and another member set fire to a shia mosque in Malmö. In 2017, Swedish Security Police reported that the number of Jihadism in Sweden had risen to thousands from about 200 in 2010. Based on social media analysis, an increase was noted in 2013. According to police in Sweden, salafist-Jihadists affect the communities where they are active.
According to Swedish researcher Magnus Ranstorp, salafi-Jihadism is antidemocratic, homophobic and aims to subjugate women and is therefore opposed to a societal order founded on democracy. According to , the salafi movement is present at nearly every major mosque in Sweden "in some form".
| + Salafist-jihadist groups as of 2014 ! Name of group ! Base of operations ! Years | ||
| Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Yusuf al-Uyayri Battalions) | Saudi Arabia | 2009–present |
| Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions) | Lebanon | 2009–present |
| Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) | Philippines | 1991–present |
| Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) | Yemen | 1994–present |
| Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) | Somalia, Ethiopia | 1994–2002 |
| Al-Qaeda (core) | Pakistan | 1988–present |
| Al-Qaeda in Aceh (a.k.a. Tanzim al Qa’ida Indonesia for Serambi Makkah) | Indonesia | 2009–2011 |
| Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) | Saudi Arabia | 2002–2008 |
| Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) | Yemen | 2008–present |
| al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC) | Algeria | 1998–present |
| Takfir wal-Hijra | Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
| Al-Mulathamun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar) | Mali, Libya, Algeria | 2012–2013 |
| Al-Murabitun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar) | Mali, Libya, Algeria | 2013–2017 |
| Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia- Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC) | Somalia, Eritrea | 2006–2009 |
| Ansar al-Islam | Iraq | 2001–present |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Egypt) | Egypt | 2012–present |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) | Libya | 2012–2017 |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Mali) | Mali | 2012–present |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia) | Tunisia | 2011–present |
| Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (a.k.a. Ansar Jerusalem) | Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2012–present |
| Ansaru | Nigeria | 2012–present |
| Osbat al-Ansar (AAA) | Lebanon | 1985–present |
| Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF, a.k.a. BIFM) | Philippines | 2010–present |
| Boko Haram | Nigeria | 2003–present |
| Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Shamil Basayev faction) | Russia (Chechnya) | 1994–2007 |
| East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM, a.k.a. Turkestan Islamic Party) | China (Xinjiang) | 1989–present |
| Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) | Egypt | 1978–2001 |
| Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen | Somalia | 2002–present |
| Harakat al-Shuada'a al Islamiyah (a.k.a. Islamic Martyr's Movement, IMM) | Libya | 1996–2007 |
| Ansar Dine | Mali | 2011–2017 |
| Hizbul Islam | Somalia | 2009–2010 |
| Caucasus Emirate (IK, or Caucasus Emirate) | Russia (Chechnya) | 2007–present |
| Indian Mujahedeen | India | 2005–present |
| Islamic Jihad Union (a.k.a. Islamic Jihad Group) | Uzbekistan | 2002–present |
| Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) | Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan | 1997–present |
| Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) | Iraq, Syria | 2004–present |
| Al-Nusra Front | Syria | 2011–present |
| Jaish ul-Adl | Iran | 2013–present |
| Jaish al-Islam (a.k.a. Tawhid and Jihad Brigades) | Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2005–present |
| Jaish al-Ummah (JaU) | Gaza Strip | 2007–present |
| Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis | Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
| Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) | Tajikistan | 2010–present |
| Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) | Indonesia | 2008–present |
| Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) | Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore | 1993–present |
| Jondullah | Pakistan | 2003–present |
| Jund al-Sham | Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip, Qatar, Afghanistan | 1999–2008 |
| Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM) | Philippines | 2013–present |
| Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, a.k.a. Mansoorian) | Pakistan (Kashmir) | 1990–present |
| Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) | Libya | 1990–present |
| Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) | Morocco, Western Europe | 1998–present |
| Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) | Mali | 2011–2013 |
| Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN) | Egypt | 2011–present |
| Mujahideen Shura Council | Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
| Salafia Jihadia (As-Sirat al Moustaquim) | Morocco | 1995–present |
| Tawhid wal Jihad | Iraq | 1999–2004 |
| Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) | Tunisia, Western Europe | 2000–2011 |
Among jihadists, establishing an uncompromising form of sharia law is a core value and goal, but strategies differ over how quickly this should be done. Observers such as the journalist Robert Worth have described jihadis as being torn between wanting to build a truly Islamic order gradually from the bottom up in order to avoid alienating non-jihadi Muslims (the desire of Osama bin Laden), and not wanting to wait for the creation of an Islamic state.
In Zinjibar, Yemen, AQAP established an "emirate" which lasted from May 2011 until the summer of 2012. It emphasized (and publicized with a media campaign) "uncharacteristically gentle" good governance over its conquered territory rather than strict enforcement of sharia law—rebuilding infrastructure, quashing banditry, and resolving legal disputes.
One jihadi veteran of Yemen described its approach towards the local population:
You have to take a gradual approach with them when it comes to religious practices. You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. We have to first stop the great sins, and then move gradually to the lesser and lesser ones. ... Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible unless you are forced to do so.
However AQAP's "clemency drained away under the pressure of war", and the area was taken back by the government. The failure of this model (according to New York Times correspondent Robert Worth), may have "taught" jihadis a lesson on the need to instill fear.
ISIS is believed to have used a manifesto which is titled "The Management of Savagery" as its model. The manifesto emphasizes the need to create areas of "savagery"—i.e., lawlessness—in enemy territory. Once the enemy was too exhausted and weakened from the lawlessness (particularly terrorism) to continue to try to govern its territory, the nucleus of a new caliphate could be established in its place.
The author of "The Management of Savagery", did not place a lot of emphasis on winning the sympathy of local Muslims, instead, he placed a lot of emphasis on the use of extreme violence, writing that: "One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening others and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them." (Social-media posts from ISIS territory "suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions occur every few weeks", according to journalist Graeme Wood.)
According to the British Researcher Anabel Inge:
"While aspects of their purist creed are shared by Jihadi groups, most—probably the vast majority of—Salafis in Europe are explicitly against terrorism. ... In Britain, the 'Salafi' label has been associated with non-violent, often quietist groups. ... One preacher, for instance, encouraged his online followers to 'mass distribute' an anti-ISIS leaflet he had written, in which he urged anyone with information about terrorist plots to 'inform the authorities'. That same preacher reported receiving death threats from ISIS sympathizers. ... I found no evidence of so-called brainwashing. On the contrary, I found that the Salafi conversion process was largely intellectual, rather than based on social or other pressures."
Traditional Salafis have rejected the use of violence by Salafi-Jihadists. The Saudi scholar Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen considered suicide bombing to be unlawfulGabriel G. Tabarani, Jihad's New Heartlands: Why the West Has Failed to Contain Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 26.Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God, p. 331 and the scholar Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad wrote a treatise entitled: According to which intellect and Religion is Suicide bombings and destruction considered Jihad?. Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani stated that "History repeats itself. Everybody claims that the Prophet is their role model. Our Prophet spent the first half of his message making dawah, and he did not start it with jihad".Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, p. 217. The vast majority of Salafis reject violence, viewing most Salafi-Jihadist groups as deviants, and are amongst their most vehement critics. It has been noted that the Western association of Salafism with violence stems from writings "through the prism of security studies" that were published in the late 20th century and that continue to persist.
According to Western analysts, obstacles in countering Salafi jihadism are funding from oil-rich Gulf nations and private donations which are difficult to track, Saudi efforts to propagate Salafiyya movement throughout the Muslim world,
resentment for Western hegemony, authoritarian Arab regimes, feeling defenseless against foreign aggression and that "Muslim blood is cheap," weak governance, extremist Salafi preaching that counters moderate voices, and other challenges.Dutch people political scientist Alex P. Schmid states:
"Salafist Jihadism ( al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) has managed to establish itself as the dominant ideology of rebellion in the early 21st century, just as Fascism and Communism had been the most violent ideologies of the twentieth century. For a brief moment in 2011, the Arab Spring with its non-violent mass demonstrations, seemed to offer an alternative model of rebellion in the absence of democratic regimes but when these mass uprisings were crushed in all countries except Tunisia, jihadism as a non-mass based method of fighting repression and foreign intervention gained the upper hand in the minds of many militant youths."
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